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Summary  findings
Adjustment programs in Sub-Saharan Africa have been  Using a new method for quantifying nontariff
somewhat less intensive in trade reform than programs  protection in terms of 'tariff  equivalence," Nash
in other countries have been. Implementation of trade  argues that, in gen.eral, countries are not in danger of
reform overall, however (but not the most important  "de-industrialization"  from the rapid disprotection  of
reforms), has been better in Sub-Saharan Africn.  import-substituting industry. However, franc-zone
Retrogression has also been more frequent.  countries showed greater declines in incentives for
As a group, the intensive adjustment lending  import substitution because of their lower rate of real
countries made significant progress in the 1980s and  devaluation. One implication may be that their ability
early 1990s, but there was significant variation a,nong  to reduce tariffs and nontariff barriers is impeded  by
them. For Sub-Saharan Africa, progress has been more  their inability to offset them with devaluations as other
impressive in recent years than in earlier years. In  countries did. Non-franc-zone countries reduced tariff-
many countries, adjustment did not begin until the  equivalent protection in recent years by 15 to 49
mid-1980s and relatively tew measures were  percentage points more than franc-zone countries,
implemented  up front.  For the franc-zone countries,  while incentives declined by 15 to 20 percentage points
underimplementation  rates are lower in the most  more in the franc-zone countries.
recent data, and by some - but not all - measures  How open are the trade regimes at this point? The
their openness has improved more in recent years. By  decline in tariff-equivalent protection,  although not
virtually all measures, however, improvements over  trivial, is insufficient to reduce the protection  to
earlier periods have not been as great for non-franc-  moderate levels reiative to deep reformers in East Asia
zone countries.  and Latin America.
Reduced protection was largely offset by real  The biggest pi oblem is with foreign exchange
devaluation in most country groups and, by most  allocation. Mauri,us  may be the only non-franc zone
meastures, incentives to produce import substitutes  Sub-Saharan country in which the currency is
actually improved  in the years immediately after the  essentially convertible and has been for some time.
first adjustmert  loan. In more recent years, the  This basic reform has not begun in most countries or
incentives have fallen modestly.  has only recently been completed (Ghana).
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Research Department - is part of larger efforts in the department  to focus on adjustment problems in Africa and to
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1.  Introduction
There is a widespread  perception  that the performance  of the tradable goods sectors in miost Sub
Saharan  (SSA) countries in the 1980's has been disappointing.  After more than a decade of
adjustment,  in some cases, export  sectors in most of these countries remain dependent on a few
primary commnodities,  whose  prices are currently very low by historical standuards.  Import substitute
producing  sectors also remain weak. There is some talk about the "de-industrialization"  of Africa,
implying  that the situation  of the industrial  sector, at least, may have deteriorated in some countries,
though this is clearly not a universal  phenomenon.
Two competing  explanations  have been advanced  for the putative  poor response to adjustment  of
the tradable  goods sectors. One is that in reality there has been very little adjustment  in policy
because  of a lack of commitment  on the part of African governments,  at least with respect to trade
policy, in spite of the fact that virtually  all SSA countries have adopted "adjustment  programs."'
Another  explanation  is that in spite of having made significant  progress in implementing  trade policy
reforms, the response  has been limited  by one or more of the following  factors: inappropriateness  of
the reforms to the African context;  poor design, pacing, or sequencing  of the reforms; unsupportive
exte;nal environment;  or inconsistency  of trade and other policies.
In countries where trade policy reforms have not been implemented  well, a number of factors may
have played a role in the failure to do so. First, there may not be a very strong predisposition  to trade
reform among many policy-makers  in the region. Policy-makers  may remain unconvinced  of the
I.  Oxford Analytica summed up this view in its December  15,-  1992 article on  "Me  Uruguay Round antd  the Developing World':
'African  countries have shown less enthusiasm for  free trade (than other developing countries).  Notable exceptions,  however, are Gambia,
Ghana,  Ivory Coast, Kenya,  Senegal, Zambia and Zaire.  Pressure from creditors and do-ors,  both bilaterally and through the Paris club,
has again been an important motivation in prompting this change of heart.benefits  of reform, perhaps because  they do not perceive that the evidence  indicates  that reforms have
led to successful  outcomes in countries where they have been tried. This in turn, may interfere with
the development  of a feeling of "ownership"  of the reform program by the local authorities, a factor
which has been identified  as important  in determining  the success of adjustment  programs in many
countries  (World Bank, 1988, 1990, 1992).  Second, the widely recogniz d problem of insufficient
institutional  cipacity may limit the ability of SSA countries to organize counterpart  teams, to enter
into a broadly-based  policy dialogue, and to implement  whatever measures  are proposed.
Finally, the political economy  of trade reform in the SSA region, as well as the fact that the vast
majority  of the countries concerned are among  the least-developed,  may require a somewhat  different
approach  to reform. An additional issue that may magnify  the importance  of all the above problems is
that the trade regimes of many African  countries in the early 1980s  were among the most
interventionist  in the world, with strong elements  of dirigisme, tight controls on foreign exchange and
large overvaluation,  and heavy direct taxation  of export sectors.  Th.is  starting position  may have
required even stronger political decisions  and better administrative  capacity, and led to fears of
heavier short-term costs than in other regions. All these factors may have made reformn  more difficult.
In light of these concerns, the purpose of this paper is to examine how trade policy reforms were
designed  and to what extent they have been implemented  in SSA.  The data on which the analysis is
based is of three types, each with its own strengths and weaknesses  (Box 1). The paper will try to
synthesize  information  from these different sources of data and exploit their complementarity  to get a
clearer and more accurate picture of implementation  experience  than could be obtained  from any one
source alone.  "Trade policy" here will be defined broadly to include measures  whose major impact is
to change  the incentives  for producing  or consuming  either tradable goods in general (versus
nontradables)  or some tradable goods relative to others.
-2  -This paper comprises  four sections including  this introduction.  Section II sets the stage by
describing  in general terms the initial conditions  of the trade regimes in SSA before the adjustment
programs began, to indicate what needed to be done to achieve a reduction in the anti-trade  bias.
Section  III examines  what trade policy actions were proposed in the adjustment  programs, the degree
to which the :roposals were implemented,  and the effect this had on the anti-trade bias. Section IV
concludes.
II. Initial conditions:  the problem of redundancy  of instruments
In a stylized description, the trade regime in a "typical"  non-CFA zone African country pre-
adjustment  could be characterized  by a fixed official  exchange  rate and rigid controls, with multiple
rates and a large black-market  premium; a restrictive  licensing  system for imports, operated in
conjunction  with the exchange controls; a fairly high and escalated  import tariff structure comprised
of several layers 2; extensive  exemptions  from duties, especially  for imported inputs used by local
producers;  reference price schemes  for imports;  government-controlled  marketing channels for major
commodity  exports (and often imports), with large explicit  or implicit ta^.es  on these exports; a lack
of institutions  to support non-traditional  exports; and cumbersome  export procedures for private
exporters, designed  to ensure repatriation  of export proceeds.  Each of these mechanisms  created a
high bias against  trade, 3 and they were to a considerable  extent redundant. That is, exchange
controls, import licenses, and tariffs all act to restrict imports and any one of them could be used to
provide any level of protection  for domestic  production.  However, although these instruments  were
2. Typicat ,  the level of tAriffs Mr a  ar  bound by obligations  under  a regional  agreement. But these  agreements  generally  put tio limit on
fiscal and other surcharges,  which can  therefore be used not  only  for fiscal, but  also for protective  purposes.
3. .Ine 1983  World  Develooment  Re_ot ra  tes  pricing policies  in the 1970s  of a sample  of 8 SSA and 23 non-SSA  de-eloping economies.
There  are 7 different pricing categories,  of which 3 -- exchange  rate, protection  of manufacturing,  and  protection or taxation of agriculture -
- relate  directly to trade  policy. Of the SSA sample,0hana  is rated  highly distoned in all 3 categories;  Nigerian and Tanzania in 2; Senegal,
Cameroon  and  Kenya  in 1. Only Malawi and Cote d'lvoire  ame  not rated highly distorted  in any  of the 3.
-3-clearly redundant  in .fect,  they were not always redundant  in purpose. African countries were (and
are) highly reliant on tariffs for revenue, and in many of them, this was the primary motive for
setting rates at high levels. (The revenue motive does not, of course, explain why rates were also very
disperse.) Exchange  controls and nontariff import controls  were often used as substitutes  for
macroeconomic  discipline  when balance  of payments crises arose, though they were applied
discriminatorily  against imports  that competed  with domestic production. Exemptions  and low rates
on inputs, of course, were generally  intended to be protective  of domestic industry.
For countries  in the CFA zone 4 many of the same instruments  were used to restrict trade, but
with one important  difference.  These countries  have convertible  currencies, pegged at a fixed rate to
the French franc. Their monetary  arrangements  among themselves  and with the French Treasury
virtually ensure against systematic,  large losses of reserves and shortages of foreign exchange  of the
same magnitude  that have plagued  other African economies. (At times, however, reserve losses  have
been avoided only with the use of stringent import licensing). Thus, foreign exchange controls  or
rationing as practiced in non-CFA countries  are less of a proolem, and black market premia tend to
be very low. The black market premium  has in recent years gen.rally averaged less than 5 percent
(see Table 5), though there have been exceptions, including 1978 (when it reached 16.5 percent),
1983  (7.8 percent), and 1989 (5.8 percent)
Likewise, many restrictions  on the export side were redundant. Requirements  to repatriate export
proceeds  at a below-market  exchange  rate, low official  procurement  prices (with a procurement
monopoly  held by a parastatal agency), export bans and licensing, and explicit taxes have all been
used to impose  taxes on export sectors. Although not every mechanism  was applied simultaneously  to
every export, in some countries,  several were used simultaneously.  In Ghana, for example, the
4. Actually two 7--es  f countries,  each of which has its own monetary union, but sirmilar arrangements. These  countries  are Benin,
Burkinm  Faso.  C,  D'lvoiz,  Mali,  Niger, and Senegal in the West African Monetary  Union, which uses the Banque Centrale des Etats de
['Afrique de l'Ou:st (BCEA-)  as cent;al bank; aid Cameroon,  the Central African Republic, Chad,  the Congo,  Equatorial Guinea,  and
Gabon, which use the Banque des Etsts de l'Afrique Centrale  (BEAC) as central bank.
- 4 -government cocoa marketing  parastatal controlled  exports, was run inefficiently  at high cost, was
taxed by the central government, and received  an extremely  low exchange  rate for exports. Private
exports were banned. Ir addition (or, one could argue, as a consequence  of these other measures), the
official  procurement  price to producers wvas  set at a level far below border parity.
One implication  of the redundancy  is that "trade policy" in the Afiican context -even  more than
in other developing  regions - must be understood in broad terms that include commercial  policy,
ex..ange rate policy, and (especially  for primary commodities)  marketing  issues as well. Another
implication  is that piecemeal  trade policy reforms do not work - as they might in other contexts  - to
gradually reduce protection and reverse the anti-trade bias. The first reforms may have little or no
effect on the bias. With no change in foreign exchange  rationing or import licensing, reduction of
tariffs will not reduce the anti-trade  bias, and may even increase it indirectly  by creating  greater
escalation in the structure or by reducing  government revenue, thereby increasing  the deficit and
contributing  to the overvaluaeion  of the exchange rate. But then, as the final redundant "layer" of
protection is peeled off, there may be a very abrupt drop in protection  as the previously  reduced
tariffs beco. ie binding (as in Ghana).
The multiplicity  of trade policy instruments  also makes it relatively simple to offset the effects of
reforms involving  one type _f measure with changes in another. Tariff reductions  can be accompanied
or followed  with increases  in fiscal duties  or other import charges (such as Ghana's "super sales tax")
to avoid reduction in protection. Or other instruments  can be substituted,  as Senegal  has done with its
reference  price scheme for imports.
Also, what appears to be reform may not in fact be a step toward reducing  protection and the anti-
trade bias. For example, in almost all SSA countries where the reform involved  a staged shifting of
imported  products from more to less restrictive  licensing (for access to foreign exchange and/or
import licensing  per  ),  the first products to be shifted were imported inputs, and the last were final
-5-products that corrpeted with local production.  Reducing  the effective  pricc (or equivalently, ir.creasing
the availability)  of inputs may well have be,  an appropriate  measure in some cases to increase the
low rates of nroductive capacity  utilization.  but the immediate  effect of such measures is in fact to
increase - not reduce  - effective protection.5
What this means is that to be effective  in reducing  the anti-trade bias, trade policy reform in the
African  context must be quite "deep," involving  aI  the layers of instruments, not just the superficial
ones.
III. What was planned and what was done? Thle  design and implementation of trade  policy
reform programs
The experience  of African countries  in designing  and implementing  reforms has been
extraordinarily  diverse. This diversity, as well as some of the issues that arose in different countries,
is discussed  in section A. This is done by examining  examples of what was planned and done with
respect to eac'i of the major categories  of trade policy. But accurate generalizations  cannot be made,
nor trends detected, based on examples. Sections  B and C, therefore, use two kinds of aggregate
statistical information  to draw inferencc regarding  design and implementation  issues for larger sub-
groups of African countries.
A.  Anecdotal evidence, country by country
1)  Exchange rate
As noted earlier, the real exchange  rate in most non-CFA SSA countries pre-adjustment  was
fixed at a significantly  overvalued disequilibrium  level, even for the existing  trade regimes, as
indicated  by chronic balance  of payments  problems. Furthermore, reducing trade restrictions has the
5. Thit  would not be the  case  in countries  where  exports  are more intensive  users  of imported inputs than are  import substitutes.  This does
not appear  to be the case  in SSA countries.
-6-effect (ceteris paribus) of depreciating  the hypothetical  equilibrium  rate. And external  shoc'.s (failing
commodity  prices, increasing  oil prices, and rising interest rates on external debt) for many countries
would have also called for real depreciation. Consequently,  virtually  all adjustment  programs 6 were
planned  to include a depreciation in the real exchange -ate. In non-CFA countries, this took the form
of devaluation  of the nominal rate, comhined  with supporting  fiscal and monetary measures. In CFA
countries, the nominal exchange  rate remained  fixed, so the effort to a^hieve a r.-ad  depreciation
concentrated  on stringent fiscal and monetary  policy to try to achieve either a nominal deflation  in the
domestic  price level or at least deflation  relative to trading partners. With few exceptions  (most
notably Zambia), countries  did achieve  some real devaluation.  For the non-CFA countries, this
amounted  to 26 percent comparing the years before to the 3 3 ears after the beginning  of the
adjustment  program, or 30 percent comparing  the 3 years before the program to the 3 most recent
years (Table 5). (For CFA countries, the real devaluation  was much smaller.) Often, howeve,, the
potential  beneficial  effects of the devaluation  for export sectors was attenuated by marketing
arrangements.  State monopolies  of export marketing  allowed the government to keep producer prices
depressed. Thus, devaluations  were accompanied  by a fall in the ratio of producer prices to border
prices, as in Madagascar  and Tanzania (Jacquemont  and Assidoii, 1988).
In some CFA countrit. (notably  Senegal and Cot; d'Ivoire), there was also an attempt to mimic
some of the effects of a nominal devaluation  by putting in place a subsidy for selected exports and
simultaneously  raising import tariff rates. (This was also the first step in Ghana's program, but was
soon followed  by nominal devaluations).  Although  these episodes  have sometimes been called "mock
devaluations,"  since they were designed  to raise the prices of both imports and exports relative to
nontradables,  their effects on prices differed considerably  from those of a nominal exchange  rate
6. Hee,  we do not draw a distinction between stabilization and adjustment programs.  Real exchange  rate adjustment can be considered part
of either one.
-7-devaluation.  One reason for this was the selective  nature of their product coverage; another was that
the rates varied, not only between  exports and imports, but among the various imports. Thus, unlike a
nominal devaluation,  these schemes  shifted  relat.,ve  prices among  tradables. Another major difference
was that  they relied on the ability  of customs to coll wt  the taritfs and of other agencies to distribute
the subsidies. These schemes never funct.oned  well (particularly  the export subsidies) and were
eventually  abandoned. More recent efforts to achieve  a real aevaluation in the CFA countries (under
the rubric of "increasing  competitiveness')  have focused on lower;  ig the effective price of non-
tradable inputs such as water, electr;city, and especially  labor through regulatory and labor market
reforms.
In non-CFA countries, the adjustment  programs generally included  significant  changes in the
mechanisms  by which foreign exchange  was allocated. These usually involved  establishment  of a pot
of foreign exchange  that would be available to fund the import  of certain products automatically  (i.e.
without  licensing). These schemes  went by different names, including "Liberalized  import Regime"
(Madagascar),"Open  General Licensing" (Uganda, Madagascar)  or exchange auctions (Ghana,
Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia). The group of products eligible  for such treatment was intended to be
expanded  over time. Sometimes  this was done by beginning  with a few products on a "positive" list
and later switching  to a "negative"  list, whereby all products were eligible except those specifically
excluded. The foreign exchange  to eligible enterprises  was sometimes  allocated at a fixed rate (as in
Uganda early on), but this usually was intendeu  to evolve into a foreign exchange auction, with
allocation  at a variable  rate depending  on fluctuations  in supply and demand at each auction. The
auction and official market would gradually merge as more products were made eligibia for auction
funding. Private sector foreign exchange  operations  were also legalized in some countries (Uganda,
Ghana, and to a lesser extent, Nigeria).
-8  -While all of these seem to be steps  toward currency convertibility,  only one Pon-Ct7A  country
(Mauritius)  seenis to have established  (and met) de facto convertibility  as an explicit goal.  In Nigeria,
where there has been no formal foreign exchange  allocation  since 1986, the "auction" did not actually
serve as a market-based  allocation  system, as evidenced  by persistent unmet demand and parallel
market permia.  As of August 1992, there existed a parallel market with a premium of 50 percent.
Some others are close; Ghana and Uganda  ha  o reasonably  well functioning  exchange  rate auctions,
which are sometimes  perceived  to be equivalent  to a well-functioning  free markeL  in foreign
exchange.  And importers  who do not wish to use the auction can go to private fore:gn exchange
bureaus. However, conceptually,  these auction mechanisms  differ in a very important  way from a true
market-based  system. The auctions  are of the Dutch variety, where successful  bidders pay their own
bid price, not the price of the marginal  bid. Thus, unlike in a market system, different users (bidders)
pay different prices for the same commodity,  with the bidders who can put the foreign exchange  to its
highest valued use (and are thus the higilest  bidders) paying the highest implicit tax.  Thus, some of
the potential benefits  of the market mechanism-especially with respect to the efficient intertemporal
resource allocation  that comes  about through attracting resources to the most profitable  activities-is
vitiated. This also raises domestic  prices above border prices for imported goods financed by
exchange  purchased  at the infra-mirginal rates, imposing  a new, variable, and non-transparent
protect.on  mechanism  if these are goods that compete  with domestic production.
There are also empirical indications  of problems  with these auctions. In Ghana, shortages have been
reported, again calling into question  whether  the auction is really being allowed  to determine a
market-clearing  rate.  In Uganda, importers  pay a significant  premium (reportedly around 8 percent)
at the private bureaus. apparently  indicating  high transaction  costs in dealing with the auctions.
In other countries, progress in moving  to a market-based  system has been virtually  nil (Kenya), or
has been reversed (Madagascar  suspended  its OGL system in late 1992, Nigeria has recently
-9-retrogressed),  or is partial and recent. Zambia started another OGL and auction system in 1991, but
some imports  are excluded and disbursements  are slow. Tanzania's latest OGL system (there was an
earlier one in the 1970's) was started in 1988, but is neither open-only  certain imports are
eligible-nor  genera!, since importers need a separate license (Lyakurwa). Whether the OGL systems
actually  constitute  a step towards reducing  protection  depends very mucih  on whether they are "open"
to goods that compete with domestic production.
Another important  exchange rate reform was the legalization  of "own-funds"  or "no forex"
imports, whereby no license was required (or was automatically  granted) for imports  made using the
foreign exchange  from the importer's own sources, whatever  they were. In Tanzania, the plan was
initially  (in 1984)  to allow only certain products to participate  in the scheme, but the government  later
decided to expand  this to virtually all imports. "Own Funds" now account for around 30 percent of
all imports in Tanzania, with open general licensing  accounting  for a similar proportion. But the
system still administratively  allocates 20-25 percent of the foreign exchange  used for imports.
Kenya in 1991 introduced  a "foreign  exchange  bearer's certificate"  scheme, which superficially
resembled  the "own funds" regime. Under Kenya's plan, a recipient of exchange  remittances  from
abroad  could exchange them for a certificate  which was a claim on the foreign exchange  whenever  the
bearer chose to withdraw it. The certificates  were tradeable, and traded at a premium  of 34-50
percent over the official rate. However, unlike some other "own funds" schemes, this one did not
eliminate  the requirement  of a license for imports  made using fcreign exchange  obtained through the
scheme. The effect was not, therefore, significant  liberalization  or reduction of protection, though it
did have other salutary effects.
2). Import  policy
a). Non-tariff  barriers (NTBs)  to imports
- 10  -All of the reform programs included  reduction  of t}e coverage of non-tariff barriers to
imports. In some of the non-CFA countries,  the exchange  allocation  and import licensing
arrangements  were inextricably  linked, so that the measures  that liberalized  the former automatically
liberalized  the latter (Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana). In countries  like Nigeria, Ghana, and Uganda,
virtually  all imports could be imported without  license by the late 1980's, using funds that could be
purchased  at auctions  or from foreign exchange  bureaus. In others, the plan was to remove the NTBs
without  significantly  changing  the foreign exchange  allocation  system. In Kenya, for example, the
import bans and "non-objection  certificates"' were removed very early (1980) while the lifting of
licensing  requirements  (initially by reducing  coverage  by 20 percent of imports) began in 1982. There
was, however, reimposition  of licensing requirements  soon thereafter, with no further progress until
1988.
Removal  of licensing requirements  in the CFA countries  (like exchange restrictions in non-CFA
countries)  was selective, i.e., applied only to certain  products. This meant that the process,
particularly in early stages, did not necessarily  reduce protection.  In Senegal, the first quantitative
restrictions  to be lifted were those on non-competing  imports  (1986-87). These measures  did not by
themselves  reduce the effective  protection  (probably  the opposite), though they were followed  within a
year by the elimination  of virtually all quantitative  restrictions  on competing  imports (except rice,
sugar, and cement)  as well. In Cote d'Ivoire, the program envisioned  removal of all quantitative
restrictions  (and replacement  with surcharges), but progress was slow and was reversed completely  in
1989 when restrictions  were reimposed  on virtually  all competing  imports. Apart from licensing,
trade regimes included  other protectionist  instruments.  One of these was the practice of assigning  a
minimum "reference  price" (unconnected  with the actual price paid on world markets) for purposes  of
7. These required that a prospective importer essentially obtain the permission of competing local producers as a condition of getting impor
license.
- 11  -levying  the import tariff, or directly establishing  a minimum  import tax. Both have been used in
Senegal, for example.  The use of reference  prices was abolished in 1986, but reintroduced  (along
with minimum  taxes on different  products) in 1989-90.
Import  prohibitions  have been used for some particularly sensitive  products, either "luxuries"  or
those competing  with domestic  production, ana have proven difficult  to eliminate. In its 1986
program, Zambia  planned to eliminate import licensing  and all protective import prohibitions, but this
was never done. Nigeria, which eliminated  other licensing  requirements in 1986, still bans a number
of agricultural items to protect domestic production.
b). Tariffs
All of the trade policy reform programs included some actions  on tariffs, but the timing and type
of action varied significantly.  There was not universal adherence  to the now-standard  recommendation
of raising tariffs on final products as NTBs are removed, then reducing  them in phases, while
increasing  rates on inputs. In Senegal, tariff rates were first raised on a few products in the early
1980's (as part of the "mock  devaluation"),  then the structure was rationalized  somewhat  by reducing
the spread between  rates on final goods and inputs from 40 percent in 1985  to 25 percent in 1988.
Most of this was done before protective NTBs were significantly  affected. In Senegal, the tariff
reforms were to some extent compromised  by reclassification  of some goods through the "Codes de
Precision." Similarly,  the first tariff reduction in Kenya, which reduced the average level from 58
percent to 50 percent, came in 1983, long before significant  action was taken to reduce NTB
coverage. As of 1986, rates in Kenya were still high and dispersed with ERPs averaging 90 percent
and ranging from -167 percent to 1,019 percent (Mosley).  In 1989, tariff reform continued  with a
rationalization  of the structure (reducing  number  of different rates from 25 to 12), and some modest
reductions  in rates in 1990.
- 12 -Ghana is an extreme case of implementing  tariff reforms before NTB reforms. The tariff structure
was rationalized  to three rates (10, 20 and 30 percent) in the early 1980's. The 2xchange  allocation
system and import licensing were not significantly  reformed until much later. When that happened in
1987-89,  the relatively low tariff rates suddenly  became the binding constraints  on imports, and
effective  protection  fell precipitously.  This led to cries of distress from domestic producers and then
to imposition  of a "super sales tax" on some imports  of 75-500 percent in January 1989. This was
lowered to a range of 10-100  percent in 1990.
Overall progress in tariff reduction in SSA has varied greatly from country to country. None,
however, have approached  (or announced  intentions  to approach)  levels or rate structure that would
be classified as low in comparison  to, say, the more open economies  of Latin America and the
Caribbean. There a number of countries  have (or are in the process of putting in place) rate structures
of around 5-20 percent 8. Ghana came closest  to this, when its rates were in the 10-30  percent range,
before introduction  of the super sales tax on imports. Nigeria's rate structure was also close to this
range after the 1988 reductions; between 1989 and  1991, however, a number of rates were raised,
some to 300 percent. Maximum  rates in most SSA countries with relatively  liberal foreign exchange
and import licensing regimes are generally  over 100 percent. Meaningful  comparisons  across
countries  are difficult  to make, however, because  the reported "ranges' and "maximum  rates" are
very dependent  on the level of aggregation  at which the data is compiled  and reported.
Another tariff-related instrument  that is often t3ed  to increase effective  protection is duty
exemption 9. Exemptions  given on imported inputs to import-competing  production have the effect of
8. Chile has for many  years had a low, uniform  tariff, though  the rate has changed  from time to time.  It is currently 12%.  Bolivia's  range
is 5-10%, Mexico  and Argentina  each have tariffs  that rmnge  from 5-20%. Cosua  Rica's range will  be 10-20%  by mid-1994,  and  the mst of
Central America  has announced  its intention  to follow  shortly.
9. Exemptions  on impons of non-competing  final good impons,  as some  countries  (e.g. Uganda)  grant to non-govemmental  organizations,
are  not directly  protective  of import-substituting  production. Nor are exemptions  on imponed input.  granted  to exporters. Indirectly,  all
exemptions  are potentially  protective  in the sense that by reduciog  revenues  they may  increase  the fiscal deficit  or require that tariffs on
other (competing)  impons be set at higher levels  for fiscal  reasons.
- 13-increasing  effective  protection. The exemptions  may be granted as part of some formal scheme (e.g.
an investment  incentive  package) or on an ad hoc basis. The exemption  system may be very complex.
Mauritius, for example, has over 400 categories  of exemptions, of which over 200 are commonly
used.  Other than food, most are on imported inputs for manufacturing.  Even leaving aside
exemptions  of inputs for export  production, exemptions  amount to 36 percent of the total import
charges that would otherwise be chargeable  in Mauritius.  In the UDEAC countries 10, the actual
collection  rates as a fraction of the duties legally  chargeable  ranged from 15 percent (Chad) to 46
percent (Gabon). The share of goods that paid the full rate was very low in all these countries ranging
from 9 percent (Chad) to 39 percent (Gabon).
A third common  tariff-related  instrument  is a requirement  that importers  deposit domestic currency
some period of time in advance of receiving  foreign exchange. This is best analyzed as a tariff, since
it raises the cost of importing by some proportion  of the value of the shipment, but does not act as a
quantitative  restraint. The amount of additional  cost depends on the length of the delay in receiving
the exchange, the opportunity  cost of the funds, and the amount of the deposit required. For example,
an advance deposit requirement  of 100 percent value, with a delay of 3 months, and an opportunity
cost of funds of 20 percent per year would be equivalent  to a tariff surcharge of 5 percent. Some
countries with relatively liberal regimes maintain  these requirements, though at reduced levels.
Nigeria reduced the requirement  from 100 percent to 25 percent in 1988. And in Kenya, where
reforms have not advanced  very far, the requirement  is currently 40 percent. In Tanzania, the
requirement  is 100 percent and in an environment  of credit scarcity, this has discouraged utilization  of
the otherwise  relatively liberal access  to foreign exchange  (Lyakurwa).
10. World Bank study, cited in EC (1992).
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Judging the extent to which protection  has been reduced by the trade policy reforms is tricky. One
problem is the redundancy  of instruments.  This tends to make true effective rates of protection  (ERPs)
higher than they would appear to be from tariff rates alone. On the other hand, smuggling  tends to
make domestic  prices lower than tariff-inclusive  border prices".  IThus,  it is impossible  to quantify
protective  effects of NTBs  or tariffs without a product-by-product  comparison of domestic  and border
prices.
Another  problem is that even in regimes where tariffs are the only or main protective instrument,
and when smuggling  is not an issue, summary measures  of tariffs are meaningless  or misleading  as
indicators  of ERP. The legal tariff schedule is misleading  because of prohibitively  high ratesI 2 and
because  of the prevalence  of exemptions. But actual collection  rates (duty collections as a fraction of
import value), which differ from the legal schedule by the average percentage  of exemptions, can be
misleading  as well. A low collection rate is sometimes  taken as an indicator  of low protection, but it
can mean  just the opposite  if the rate is low because  of exemptions  on non-competing  imported inputs
or because inputs carry low legal tariffs relative  to final products ("escalated  tariff structure"). And
these are, in fact, the most common causes of low collection  rates.
A few studies have estimated  effective rates of protection,  taking account of the escalation  in the
tariff structure (i.e., the higher rate on final products). Mosley estimated  sectoral ERP's in Kenya
before the latest reforms to range from -167 percent to 1,019 percent. averaging 90 percent.
(However,  such range estimates  are very sensitive  to the level of aggregation  of products into
sectors). Rouis traced the evolution of the "average" ERP in Senegal, based on changes in the
I1.  One study in Cameroon  concluded  that  even though  imports of textiles  were controlled by licensing  and carried  a tariff rate of 135%
domeatic  prices  only  exceeded  border prices by 35 %  This was  attributed to illegal imports.
12. Once  the tariff rate  on a given item reaches  a certain point, imports fall to nil. Rates  higher than this do not have any effect  on
protection. Many tariff regimes  in relatively closed economies  have a number of examples  of such 'water'  in the  tariff,  which makes
protection  appear  to be higher than it actually is.
- 15 -nominal tariff rates and certain assumptions  about  the average value added, and found the ERP fell
from 165 percent in 1985 (pre-reform)  to 89 percent in 1988, then increased, reaching 98 percent in
1990. A study of protection  based on surveys of import-substituting  manufactured  firms in the
UDEAC countries  indicated  that 23 of the firms (out of 76 useable surveys) showed negative  value
added (infinite  ERPs) at world prices, while 8 others had ERPs greater than 600 percent. In Tanzania
in the early 1980's, the average rate of effective  protection  in manufacturing  was estimated to be 500
percent, declining  to 150 percent in 1985  due to increased imports  through the "own funds" scheme.
3)  Export policy
An important  distinction  must be drawn between  traditional  exports (mostly  agricultural or mineral)
and non-traditional  exports. For the former, the major issues  have been direct taxes or indirect  taxes
administered  via state-owned  marketing  enterprises (sometimes  called marketing  boards), exchange
policies, and sometimes  legal barriers to exports. Non-traditional  exports hame  not generally been
explicitly taxed nor marketed  by state monopolies.  The major issues for them have been how to put in
place mechanisms  to compensate  for the overall anti-trade  bias inherent in the import regime, and in
some cases licensing  procedures  that are cumbersome,  though not intended  to be restrictive.
a). Traditional
Several countries  have gone a long way toward eliminating  taxes and allowing  producer prices to
be set by border prices. The most successful in this was Nigeria, where the marketing  boards for
cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, rubber, and palm kernels were simply abolished,  thereby eliminating  them
as a vehicle for taxing producers. However  there has been some back-tracking;  bans have been
imposed  on exports of skins, wood, palm kernels, and some grains to encourage  domestic processing.
There has also been some discussion  of a ban on cocoa exports, but no action so far. Madagascar
moved  slowly, but eventually  (1988) turned over internal  and external marketing  of export crops
- 16 -(except vanilla)  to the private sector and in 1987 abolished  export taxes, except those on cloves,
vanilla and coffee.
In countries  where one or a few crops provide most export earnings - coffee and cocoa in Cote
d'lvoire, cocoa in Ghana, coffee in Uganda  - reforms have been especially  slow, at least partially
out of concern over government  revenue losses. The government  in Cote d'Ivoire planned (though it
did not really carry through) the elimination  of taxes on all exports, e  coffee and cocoa. In
Ghana, there was no real effort to privatize  cocoa marketing until a pilot program to license private
purchases was launched in the early 1990's. Price reforms in Ghana have taken the form of raising
cocoa producer prices, rather than institutionalizi.g  a X .!eiai.ism to link domestic and border prices.
Plans to divest some plantations  of the marketing  board were announced  in 1984 and again in 1986-
87, but with limited actions.
Uganda began late, but has made some progress, beginning  with increases in coffee producer prices
in 1987, then continuing  in 1991  with replacement  of the coffee pricing system with a system of floor
price and variable levy (to link prices more closely with border prices), and (in 1992) with reforms to
allow  private exporters  to compete  with the marketing  board. It is noteworthy, however, that other
(nontraditional)  exports were given exchange  retention privileges in 1989  and had licensing
requirements  eliminated  in 1990, with coffee specifically  excluded. Similarly, non-traditional
exporters  in Tanzania were allowed to retain 50 percent of their foreign exchange earnings, while
traditional  exporters  were restricted  to 10 percent. Another problem in Tanzania  has been the
reluctance  to abolish or significantly  reform the traditional export marketing  boards, with the result
that very little of the benefit of the devaluations  has been passed on to producers.
A number of countries have in place export bans on certain products. Some of these are linked to
environmental  concerns  (e.g., Uganda's ban on ivory exports) or are used to prevent the export of
food or raw materials  that are subsidized  domestically.  Others are simply attempts to protect domestic
- 17 -processors  by keeping their raw materials  priced lower than their world market values (e.g., logs in
Ghana).
b.) Non-traditional
Attempts  to promote non-traditional  exports have taken several forms. One of the early forms
was  direct export subsidies based on the value of exports. Kenya and Tanzania operated such systems
in the 1970s  and early 1980's,  as did Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire, as part of the mock devaluation
schemes  in the latter two countries. These systems encountered  problems such as slow disbursement,
high fiscal cost and fraud (e.g., fish were smuggled  into Senegal, then re-exported  to collect the
subsidy),  and have by now been abandoned. Other countries  have given exporters special subsidies,
such as tax holidays, income tax refunds, and depreciation  allowances (Ghana, Mauritius, Nigeria).
Most of the SSA countries have attempted  to implement  some type of system to allow exporters  to
be either exempt ex ante from taxes on imported inputs (in-bond or temporary admissions  schemes  or
export processing  zones) or to have these taxes rebated ex post (drawback  mechanisms).  The effective
operation  of these schemes is critically important  to allow exporters to compete  on world markets,
where other firms have access to imported inputs on a duty- and restriction-free  basis. Their
importance  is magnified  by the high protection  accorded to local manufacturers  of inputs in SSA
countries. In Cote d'lvoire, empty metal boxes used for canning are 20-40 percent more costly  than ini
France or Thailand, with local production  a virtual monopoly  protected by a high tariff. Polystyrene
boxes  used to package exported fish are five times as expensive  in Cote d'Ivoire as in TLunisia  (World
Bank 1992  b).
In spite of all the attempts  to simplify life for exporters, they still face lengthy delays and
regulatory  burdens in many countries, or at best, reforms to change this situation  are very recent.
Examples  of drawback schemes  that are new or recently improved include Senegal (1990-91);  Malawi
(1991); Tanzania (1988); Uganda (1990); Zambia (1991) and Nigeria (1991). In Madagascar  and
- 18 -Tanzania, delays have been related to export licensing  or certification. In Tanzania, as a result of
establishment  of a Trade Facilitation  Council, the average waiting time for each export license has
recently been reduced from 6 months to one week, though to make the system operational  required 8
years of effort and a Presidential  decree (Lyakurwa).
In other countries, even where licenses are not a major problem (e.g., Ghana and Uganda), there
are lengthy delays and rnuch "red tape" required to obtain rebates on imported duties. This has been a
very common complaint  among exporters, and is so serious that many firms simply do not find it is
worth the bother to use the schemes.  The complexity  of the systems is related to the lack of trust the
governments  have in exporters (World Bank 1992b).
Other than Mauritius, which has implemented  an EPZ system with spectacular success, none of the
SSA countries has managed to put in place a system of exemption  or rebate that is successful in
attracting wide-spread  participation  by exporters. (Madagascar  has also had some moderate success,
largely as a spill-over effect from Mauritius).  One reason for the disbursement  delays is that the
mechanisms  have not relied on "standard"  input-output  coefficients  like the East Asian schemes.
Thus, importers  must document  their input  use for each shipment. Another major problem has been
that these schemes  have not been accorded  priority in allocating  the budget, so shortages have
prevented  disbursement  of the rebates.  Also, some have been designed  to rebate only part of the
duties paid on imputs  used for exports (half in Nigeria, raised to 100 percent in 1991). As a result, as
of 1992, exporters  in Tanzania were still waiting  over a year for drawback  disbursements  because  of
budget  shortages.  Kenya began an ex ante exemption  scheme in 1992, though it has had a drawback
schemp for some time. The drawback scheme,  however, was never heavily used, because of the slow
disbursements  and reluctance of the government  to provide  adequate funding for the drawbacks. The
latest improvements  in the Nigerian system appear promising, as they make half of the drawback
available  upon application, thereby mitigating  the problem  of delays. (This was combined with an
- 19 -increased  budgetary  allocation.)  The Nigerian  system is also promising in that it relies on standard
coefficients,  with exporters able to apply for individual  coefficients  if they wish.
New Export Processing  Zones (EPZs) or in-bond schemes  have been established  in Nigeria (in-
bond, 1991); Kenya (EPZ, 1990; in bond, 1989); Togo (EPZ, 1989); and Zambia (in-bond, 1991-
92). The schemes  in Togo and Madagascar  follow the Mauritius example  of allowing EPZ status for
individual  factories. These EPZ and in-bond schemes  have the advantage  for exporters of providing  ex
ante exemption;  that is, import duties are not paid, so there is no need to rely on the vagaries of a
rebate system. However,  they have the inherent limitation  that they can be used only by
manufacturers  that export all (or virtually all) their production. (A few countries, !ike Mauritius,
allow limited sales in the local market.) They tend to be used only by a few large firms-especially
in-bond  schemes  (World Bank, 1992b).
To some extent, the regulatory burden on exporters is also connected  to the foreign exchange
system. Exporters do not generally  have automatic  access to foreign exchange (and import licenses),
so they are forced  to deal with the red tape of the allocation  system (World Bank, 1992b). Since
exporters are required to repatriate exchange  and often are allowed  to retain only part of their
earnings (and in some cases cannot  sell even the retained portion), governments  have felt it necessary
to closely regulate activities. This has changed  recently in some countries. But in most countries,
allowable  retention  rates are relatively  low; the idea is to allow exporters to retain little more than the
foreign exchange  they will need for their imported inputs. In some countries, restrictions on foreign
exchange  retention  by exporters  have been relaxed somewhat; in others they have been tightened. In
Uganda and Zambia in 1991-92,  exporters (except coffee in Uganda)  can retain and sell all their
earnings. This has been true in Nigeria since 1986, though there is still a repatriation requirement  and
funds must be deposited  in special accounts. In Ghana, the goal was to allow 50 percent retention;
retention  rates are now 5-35 percent, depending  on the product. When Tanzania introduced its
- 20 -scheme, the retention  rate was 50 percent, but this was subsequently  reduced  to 35 percent
(Lyakurwa).  In Kenya, the retention  system has had a very stop and go history. The rate was at first
(in August 1992)  set at 100 percent for nontraditional  goods exporters, and 0 for all others, but wac
expanded  to include traditional  products at a 50 percent rate in late 1992. Shortly thereafter, the
whole scheme was suspended  and the retention  accounts nationalized  (at a low official exchang- rate)
when the government's relations with the IMF and World Bank broke down. Very recentiy, the
scheme  has been reinstated, with a 50 percent rate applicable  to all exports (including services).
Retention  schemes  have on balance  been helpful, but in some cases have had unintended
consequences  when other distortions  remain. In Ghana, wood processors  encountered  shortages of
high-quality  timber because loggers had a high incentive  to export the timber to be eligible for the 20
percent foreign e. ehange retention  scheme. This problem might have been resolved  by making
indirect  exporters eligible for the retention. Unfortunately,  the government  tried to resolve the
problem by lowering the retention  rate for log exporters  and banning  certain types of exports
altogether.
Other reforms in export-related  policies have also come only recently,  or are seriously
compromised  by macroeconomic  policies. Investment  codes in many African  countries have been
liberalized  to encourage foreign direct investment  (Zimbabwe  in 1989; Tanzania  and Malawi in 1990,
Zambia and Burundi more recently). But foreign exchange shortages  and regulations necessitate
restrictions  on royalty payments, profit repatriation, and payment of expatriate  staff (World Bank
1992b).  Macroeconomic  imbalances  also lead to high government borrowing  requirements, which
crowd out export finance. Infrastructural  problems  and associated  high cost of transportation, energy,
and water are also high on the list of exporters' problems, but are beyond  the scope of this report.
- 21 -B. An overview from  the ALCID.  comparison of SSA and other countries
The Adjustment  Lending Conditionality  and Implementation  Database (ALCID) contains
information  on policy actions taken in conjunction  with adjustment  loans of the World bank (Box 1).
Virtually all countries in SSA, and many developing  wountries  in other regions, received such loans in
the 1980s. Generally, any policy reforms undertaken  as part of an adjustment  prograrn were discussed
in the loan documents  and were thus included in the database. Thus the ALCID contains arguably  the
most comprehensive  catalog available  ot policy reforms in the developing world in the 1980s.  The
level of generality used in classifying  these r  licy actions in the ALCID does not allow in-depth
aggregate  analysis. But the breadth of coverage  makes possible meaningful  comparisons  of general
patterns across time and across regions. Below, I first discuss evidence  regarding the design of reform
programs, then regarding their imp!ementation.
I)  Wnat was planned
Policy actions supposed  to be taken as part of adjustment  programs in SSA countries have
consistently  emphasized  trade policy and exchange  rate (TPER) measures less than has been the case
in non-SSA  countries. For the whole period 1980-92, 16.8 percent of the actions specified in non-
SSA adjustment  loans were TPER, compared  to 12.2 percent in SSA adjustment  loans (Table 1). This
pattern holds for every year in this period, except 1980 and 1988. It also holds for critical actions,
i.e., those that are judged by the task manager  of a World Bank adjustment  loan to have been critical
to the success of the adjustment  program: 22.7 percent were TPER in non-SSA, compared to 16.4
percent in SSA. As in non-SSA  countries,  TPER actions in SSA have received diminished emphasis
since 1986-87,  when they represented 17.6 percent of all actions in SSA and 24.3 percent in non-SSA
(28.8 percent and 31.8 percent of critical actions). In subsequent years, they have represented
between  5.7 percent and 12.5 percent of all actions  in SSA and between 10.2 percent and 18.0
percent in non-SSA.  TPER actions  have represented  a somewhat  smaller proportion  of conditions  in
CFA countries (8.5 percent from 1980-92)  than in.other SSA countries (13.9 percent).
- 22 -Table 1. Conditions  related  to trade policy-'  (percent)
Other countnes  Sub-Saharan  All counines
Year  Non-7TER  TPER  Non-7'PEP!  TPER  Non-TPC  TPER
1980  71..  28.8  60.0  40.0  67.9  32.1
1981  72.2  27.8  80.8  19.2  7.5.8  24.2
1982  85.0  15.0  95.0  5.0  87.0  13.0
1983  72.9  27.1  82.9  17.1  76.4  23.6
1984  61.8  38.2  86.5  13.5  73.9  26.1
1985  87.2  12.8  90.3  9.7  88.3  11.7
1986  76.3  '3.7  80.9  19.1  78.8  21.2
1987  76,2  24.8  84.6  16.4  79.5  20.5
1988  89.8  13.2  88.1  11.9  89.0  11.0
1989  82.0  18.0  88.0  12.0  84.5  15.5
1990  89.7  10.3  94.3  5.7  92.3  7.7
1991  87.0  13.0  88.8  11.2  87.7  12.3
1992  88.6  11.4  89.8  10.2  89.2  10.8
ALL  83.2  16.8  87.8  12.2  85.3  14.7
-'TPER=Trade  Policy Conditions
Source:  World  Bank ALCID
Table 2. Sub-Saharan  Africa trade  policies (pe.cent)
Poli(y  C.
Exchange  MIX  M  dunesl  X di. "esl  MIX  Other  Other  Other
rate  Quantitative  sub.  sub.  ftnance  X regime X insn,  trade
Year  rest.  & promo. policies  All
1980  10.0  20.0  20.0  0.0  0.0  10.0  10.0  10.0  100.0
1981  20.7  3.4  10.3  10.3  13.8  20.7  10.3  10.3  100.0
1982  75.0  0.0  25.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  100.0
1983  21.4  7.1  10.7  0.0  32.1  21.4  7.1  0.0  100.0
1984  8.8  14.7  14.7  5.9  2.9  29.4  20.6  2.9  100.0
1985  19.0  33.3  9.5  4.8  4.8  9.5  9.5  9.5  100.0
1986  17.9  17.9  17.9  8.5  7.5  14.2  10.4  5.7  100.0
1987  16.7  10.8  34.2  6.7  2.5  9.2  6.7  13.3  100.0
1988  13.3  15.9  17.7  2.7  7.1  12.4  15.0  1 .9  100.0
1989  23.1  13.5  32.7  3.8  0.0  12.5  2.9  11.5  100.0
1990  14.3  19.6  10.7  10.7  0.0  8.9  21.4  14.3  100.0
1991  8.8  25.0  26.5  1.5  4.4  1.5  17.6  14.7  100.0
1992  15.9  25.6  17.1  6.1  3.7  18.3  4.9  8.5  100.0
ALL  16.5  16.8  21.7  5.4  5.2  12.8  10.8  10.8  100.0
Source:  World Bank  ALCID
In SSA loans, actions related to import duties have been the most common (21.7  percent of all
TPER actions), followed by quantitative  restrictions on  imports and exports (16.8 percent),  exchange
rate (16.5 percent),  "other" export incentives and regime'3 (12.8 percent),  "other trade policies"" 4
13.  Oththr  export incentives and regime'  means not related to credit  or direct subsidies.
14.  'Other  trade policy'  measures were often studies or agreement on a plan to take action later.
- 23 -and "other export institutions  and promotion" (each with 10.8 percent), export duties/subsidies  (5.4
percent) and import/export  finance (5.2 percent)(Table  2). The patterns in CFA and other SSA
countries was similar, with two exceptions:  CFA countries, as expected,  had virtually no conditions
related to the exchange  rate, and they had relatively  more conditions  related to export duties and
subsidies. This latter finding was apparently  related to the "mock  devaluation"  episodes (see below)
CFA countries also differed from other SSA countries  in an important  aspect of sequencing. In the
latter countries, conditions  related to removal of quantitative  controls were more concentrated  in the
pre-loan period than were conditions  related to duties and subsidies. This pattern was reversed in
CFA countries.
With respect to timing of actions, adjustment  loans to Africa have placed somewhat less emphasis
on planned implementation  prior to effectiveness' 5 of the loar. than h.ave  non-SSA  loans. In SSA,
25.7 percent of TPER actions were supposed  to be pre-effectiveness,  compared to 35.1 percent in
non-SSA. In some cases there was a conscious  decision by the World  Bank not to delay loans until
actions had been taken, due to the urgent need for foreign exchange. This was the case, for exarnple,
in Ghana, where the economy  was virtually  grinding  to a halt. SSA loans, however, placed more
emphasis  on legal conditions  than did non-SSA  (30.0 percent of TPER actions in SSA, compared to
26.3 percent in other countries).
2)  What was done
The three implementation  categories  - canceled, non- and partial implementation  - together are
referred to here as "under-compliance"  or "under-implementation".  Among all TPER actions  called
for in SSA loans, 64.6 percent were fully or over-implemented;  19 percent were substantially
implemented;  and 16.4 percent were under-implemented  as of the release of the last tranche of the
15. The datc of 'effectiveness'  is the date  the loan (or parn  of it) becomes  available  to the borrower.
- 24 -loan (Table 3). Comparable  figures for non-SSA  loans were 55.1 percent, 18.) percent and 21.4
percent.  16  This under-compliance  rate for the CFA countries  was 26 percent, compared to 14.1
percer.t for other SSA countries. In SSA, the types of actions with minimal under-compliance  were
exchange  rate, import/export  quantitative  restrictions, and import duties/subsidies,  with under-
compliance  rates of 6-13 percent. Those with greatest under-compliance  were export  duties/subsidies,
other trade policies, and other export institutions/promotion.  (However, all of the under-compliance
with "export  duties/subsidies",  and much of the problem with "other trade policies", was in the CFA
countries.)  This pattern was slightly  different in non-SSA  loans, where other export
institutions/promotion,  exchange  rate, and other trade policies were clearly the greatest problems, and
export duties/subsidies,  import/export  quantitative  restrictions, and other export regime the least
serious problems. With respect to the type of reforms most directly associated with institutions  -
"other  export institutions  and promotions"  - implementation  in SSA was somewhat  better than in
other countries as of last tranche release (27.6 percent under-implementation  versus 38.3 percent), but
slightly  worse than in other countries  as of the most recent implementation  information.
Table 3. IT implementation  for Sub-Saharan  Africa-'  (percent)
Poolicy  code  Canceled  Non  Partial  Substanrial  Full  Over  ALL
Exchange rate  0.0  6.3  0.0  22.9  68.8  2.1  100.0
M/X Quantitative rest.  0.0  2.4  7.1  19.0  69.0  2.4  100.0
M duties/sub  4.4  0.0  8.9  15.6  66.7  4.4  100.0
X duties/sub  14.3  0.0  14.3  14.3  57.1  0.0  100.0
M/X finance  0.0  9.1  13.6  22.7  54.5  0.0  100.0
Other X regime  0.0  7.3  9.8  17.1  65.9  0.0  100.0
Other X inst. & promo  0.0  13.8  13.8  24.1  48.3  0.0  100.0
Other trade  policies  0.0  4.5  13.6  9.1  13.6  59.1  100.0
ALL  I .9  6.1  8.4  19.0  63.1  1.5  100.0
- IT is implementation  as  of last tranche release.
Source: World Bank ALCID
16. Figures  do not add to 100%  because  4.6% were coded *futther  monitoring  irrelevant.-
- 25  -In both SSA and non-SSA, under-compliance  rates for TPER actions overall were lower based on
most recent information1 7 than on last tranche release -- 11.8 percent versus 16.4 percent in SSA
(Table  4), and 11.4 percent versus 21.4 percent in non-SSA. In non-CFA Africa, the most recent
under-compliance  rates for exchange  rate actions and for quantitative  restrictions were higher than the
last tranche rate. All other conditions  showed  lower or the same under-compliance  rates in the most
recent sample. In th.  CFA sample, all categories  showed  improvement  in the most recent rates.
In SSA, implementation  of "critical" TPER conditions  was worse than for all TPER conditions
(17.7 percent under-compliance  versus 11.8 percent). This pattern was true for CFA and non-CFA
Africa, though the difference was greater in the CFA countries. In non-SSA, in contrast,
implementation  rates were better for critical  than for all TPER conditions  (6.5 percent under-
compliance  versus 11.4 percent). The SSA under-compliance  rate for critical conditions  was thus
considerably  higher than non-SSA  (17.7  percent versus 6.5 percent).
In SSA, TPER actions that were to be implemented  before loan effectiveness  had an under-
compliance  rate of 12.5 percent compared  to 11.6 percent for other actions. For non-SSA, the figures
are 4.5 percent for pre-effectiveness  conditions  and 12.7 percent for others. For legal TPER
conditions  in SSA. the under-compliance  rate was 7.5 percent, compared to 14.6 percent for other
actions. In non-SSA,  under-compliance  was 11.9 percent for legal conditions, and 11.1 percent for
other actions.
17.  This paragraph  is based on implementation information as of the most recent information coded in the ALCID.  In some cases, the
most recent information  was as of last tranche release. In others, more recent information  (either 1988 or 1989) was available,  indicating
how the implementationstatus  of each condition changed afler the loan was fully disbursed.
- 26 -Table 4. Most reent  implementation for Sub-Saharan Africa (percent)
Policy  code  Canceled  Non  ParIal  Substannal  Full  Over  Monitonne  AILL
irrelevant
Exchange  rate  0.0  10.4  0.0  14.6  62.5  6.3  6.3  100.0
M/X  Quantitative  rest.  0.0  7.1  2.4  9.5  69.0  2.4  9.5  100.0
M duties/sub  4.4  0 0  2.2  11.1  66.7  4.4  11.1  100.0
X duties/sub  14.3  0.,  7.1  14.3  28.6  0.0  35.7  100.0
M/X  finance  0.0  9.1  0.0  22.7  36.4  0.0  31.8  100.0
Other  X regime  0.0  7.3  2.4  12.2  61.0  2.4  14.6  100.0
Other  X inst.  & promo  0.0  12.8  25.5  14.9  34.0  6.4  6.4  100.0
Other  trade  policies  4.5  9.1  0.0  13.6  59.1  0.0  13.6  100.0
ALL  1.9  7.2  2.7  14.1  57.4  3.0  13.7  100.0
Source:  World  Banl  ALCID
3) Hypotheses  from the ALCID data
From this general picture of reforms in SSA and comparisons  with other regions, it is not
possible to reach firm conclusions,  but the evidence  does at least suggest hypotheses. Trese are
discussed  here with suggested  evidence.
a) Non-CFA  African countries  had a very good implementation  of minor reforms, but much worse
implementation  than other countries  of the really key ("critical") TPER  actions.  In SSA,
implementation  of "critical" TPER actions was substantially  worse than for all TPER actions. And,
since the converse  was true in other countries, implementation  of critical TPER actions in SSA was
much  worse than in other countries (17.7 percent under-compliance  in SSA, versus 6.5 percent in
others). The discrepancy was greater in the CFA countries.  This finding could account for much of
the perception  of implementation  problems in SSA.
b) Because  they concentrated  on tariff measures in the early stages, some of the adjustment
programs did not significantly  reduce the anti-export  bias, which came primarily  from exchange
controls, import licensing, and direct or indirect  export taxes.
Given the redundant  restraints  on trade, it might be expected  that top priority would have been
given to exchange  rate reforms, since as long as multiple  and overvalued rates and administrative
allocation remained  in place, imports would continue  to be restricted (regardless  of import licensing
- 27  -or tariffs) and exports repressed. After this, removal of quantitative  restrictions on imports and
exports would be meaningful  in the sense that protection  or taxation would then be provided by
relatively transparent  means (import  tariffs and export taxes), which could then be reduced. While
administrative  allocation  of foreign exchange is in place, reforms related to quantitative  import
controls or tariffs may have little effect on protection  rates.
In some respects, the observed pattern of planned actions  followed  this pattern. For example, some
exchange  rate adjustment  featured prominently  in the planned programs in the non-CFA countries,
though in the early 1980s, implementation  was another matter. But in other ways there are
discrepancies.  In the CFA countries (and some non-CFA), the relatively light emphasis  on reducing
quantitative  controls  before tariff and tax reform is somewhat  puzzling. In some countries, Uganda
being one, the early emphasis  on tariff reforms can be understood  as attempts  to raise revenue, rather
than reduce protection, but in others (Ghana) this was not so.
Given the prevalence  of the heavy taxation  of exports, it is not clear why these reforms were a
relatively  small part of the program. To some extent, this may reflect the fact that the taxation  was
often not direct; thus reducing it may have required reforms in parastatal marketing  institutions, rather
than tax reduction  per se. But in other cases, direct taxation  reduction was explicitly  planned, but not
implemented  as scheduled  (Cote d'lvoire, Senegal). Another explanation  may be concern for the
revenue implications  of lowering  taxes, given the high dependency  on taxes on mineral and
agricultural exports. Dependency  on cocoa revenues  made Ghana's reforms in the cocoa sector
(including  reduction  of taxation  levels) very difficult.
These observations  suggest  that early SSA reforms may not have really reduced the anti-export
bias very much, since they were concentrated  more on only one of the redundant layers of protection,
tariffs.  Other, more binding  protection  measures, such as exchange controls, quantitative  restraintsand export taxes, were addressed, but perhaps not sufficiently  to allow the tariffs to become the
binding  constraint.
c) Actions related to exchange rates and controls were important  and well-implemented  in SSA
initially, but there was some backsliding  in SSA (versus  continued  progress in other countries),
undercutting  the overall reform  process in SSA. In actions  not related to the exchange  rate, SSA
countries  continued  to make some  progress in implementation  after  final tranche release, but progress
was much slower than in other countries.
Overall, SSA countries had a somewhat  better implementation  record of planned TPER actions
than did other countries, as of the last disbursement  of the adjustment  loans. Furthermore, the best
short-run implementation  in SSA was in the area of perhaps the most serious problems, exchange
rates (under-implementation  rate of 6.3 percent for SSA, versus 31.3 percent for others). These
patterns changed, however, when the criterion was implementation  as of the most recent information.
By this measure, implementation  rates of TPER actions  overall was virtually identical in SSA and
other countries. And with respect to exchange  rate actions, whereas under-implementation  in non-SSA
fell from 31.3 percent as of last tranche release to 6.3 percent, the rate in SSA rose from 6.3 percent
to 10.4 percent' 8. The implication  is that at least some SSA countries made much slower progress
than countries in other regions after last tranche release in continuing  to implement  previously  planned
actions, and in the important  area of exchange  rates, there was some backsliding.  The
underimplementation  rate for CFA countries (26 percent) was considerably  higher than that for non-
CFA (14 percent). The most recent rate for the CFA (18 percent) was also higher than for the non-
CFA.
18. Note that  these implementation  figures are for non-CFA countries,  since nominal exchange rate movement was never part of the planned
adjustment  programs in the CFA zone.
- 29 -d)  Trade  policy reform  programs in SSA were slower than those in non-SSA, partly by design
and even more so because of low implementation  of 'up front'  conditions. The implementation  record
of actions  not legally required was  poor. The relatively  low reliance on reforms  planned to be quickly
implemented  and the poor record on reforms  that were not legal conditions  make it appear that TPER
actions  in SSA may have been implemented  reluctantly.
With respect to timing, SSA reform programs were less "front-loaded"  than reform programs in
other countries, in both TPER and non-TPER  actions. In SSA, 25.7 percent of TPER actions were
planned for implementation  before effectiveness  of the associated loans, compared to 35.1 percent in
non-SSA.  In Ghana, and perhaps other SSA countries, there was an explicit effort to avoid up front
conditions  that might be difficult  to implement,  so as not to interfere with the rapid disbursement  of
urgently needed  funds. Furthermore, the under-compliance  rate for these up-front actions was
relatively  high in SSA (12.5 percent). 19 Thus, in SSA a relatively small fraction of the policy
actions  were both planned to be done quickly  and actually  implemented  on schedule.
TPER adjustment  programs in SSA placed more emphasis  on legal conditions, as opposed  to
actions that were taken before  the loan or were intended  to be taken, but were not legally required
for release of funds. Legal conditions  were 30.0 percent of TPER actions in SSA adjustment
programs, compared to 26.3 percent in non-SSA.  And in SSA, the under-implementation  of legal
conditions  was much lower than under-implementation  of non-legal actions (7.5 percent versus 14.6
percent). In non-SSA, the rate of under-implementation  for legal conditions  and that for other actions
were almost identical (11.9 percent and 11.1 percent). The evidence  on timing of actions (relatively
few up-front actions in SSA) and on implementation  patterns (much worse in SSA for actions not
legally  required to get access to the loan funds)  provides some support for the hypothesis  that these
19.  This compares to  4.5 percent  in non-SSA  for up-front actions, and 11.6 percent  for actions in SSA not intended  to be taken  up-front.
- 30 -TPER adjustment  programs in SSA were planned and implemented  more reluctantly and with less
conviction  of their benefits than in other countries.
C. Evidence  on reforms  from performance of trade-related  variables
The ultimate test of whether an economic  policy change has been effectively implemented,  of
course, is whether it has an effect on real economic  activity. In this section, I examine the behavior  of
a number  of economic  variables that would be expected  to change with trade policy changes.  The
movements  in these variables are reported in Tables 5 and 6. For each variable, the "After" column
shows the change  from the three years before the beginning  of structural adjustment  (the year of the
first World Bank Structural Adjustment  Loan or IMF Structural Adjustment  Facility) to the three
years after. (The year the loan or facility was made available is excluded.) The "Recent" column
shows the change from three years before to the three most recent years. For non-trade policy
adjusting  countries  (including  those that began adjusting in 1991), The "Recent" column is based on a
comparison  of 1980-82  to 1989-91. The rows report the averages of several groupings  of countries,
the members  of which are listed in the table.
1.  Indirect indicators of trade policy changes
The first variable, the real effective exchange  (REER), can be considered a direct policy variable in
the short run. In the medium term, however, the sustainable  equilibrium  level of the REER is
determined  by (among  other things) trade policy; the more open the regime (ceteris paribus), the
more depreciated  the equilibrium  REER. The level of the REER index is not meaningful,  but its
direction  of movement  is. Taken as given that the pre-adjustment  level was substantially
-31  -overvalued 20, depreciation is either a policy of greater openness  pr  se or an indirect indicator  of
such a policy shift. The results in Table 5 indicate  that on average, SSA countries did devalue their
currencies in real terms. (The means and medians  tell similar stories.) The only sub-group whose
currencies did not devalue in real terms is the non-trade-adjusting  group. As expected, the CFA
countries devalued (in real terms) only modestly, while the most intensive adjusting  countries
achieved  the largest devaluation  on average. The countries  showing the largest real devaluations  were
Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozarnbique,  Madagascar,  and Sierra Leone.
The second variable in Table 5 is the change in the black-market  premium (BMP). The BMP is an
indicator  of several trade-policy-related  variables (among  other things), including  restrictiveness  of
foreign exchange  licensing and mis-alignment  of the REER. The mean BMP fell, Uut  there were
substantial  differences across groups and even within groups. As the small median figures show,
there were about as many countries in each group where the BMP increased as decreased.  But there
were several examples  of spectacular  declines, such as Ghana (a change of 2,059 percentage  points
from pre-adjustment  to the most recent years), Guinea (1,042), Nigeria (247), Uganda (186), and
Tanzania (158).
20. This  is supported  by a number  of indicators,  including  chronic balance  of payments  difficulties and the large real appreciation  of SSA
currencies  in the 1970s  and  early 1980s,  The IMF World Economic  Outlook, 1982  estinuted on average  SSA currencies  appreciated  in real
terms by 44 percent  between  1973  and 1981.
- 32 -Table S. Performance  of trade  policy-related  economic variables: Mean  (lines  1-7)  and  Median  (lines 8-14)
(1)  2)  (3)  (4)  (S)  (6)  (7) REER  BMP  MIGDP  CM/M  NFCM8ANFM  CM/Can  Mfcw/Con
Afier  Recent  AJier  Recent  Afier  Recent  After  Recent  Afier  Recent  Afier  Rece  After  ReceNt
I.  SSA  -22.0  -24.9  -33.4  -55.6  -. 7  -0.4  0.2  0.5  II  2.6  -1.6  -1.9  -0.6  -0.4
2.  CFA  i  -11.1  -10.S  1.4  2.0  -5.0  -6.9  -2.4  -1  .3  -0.9  0.0  -1.7  -2.6  -0.8  -1.2
3.  Non-CFA  -25.9  -30.2  -48.5  -82.0  0.3  3.3  0.6  0.4  0.6  2.4  -1.6  -1.6  -0.8  -0.3
4  IAL  -38.1  -41.6  -162.6  -192.5  2.3  3.5  3 7  3.6  4.3  6.6  135  0.2  1  9  2.2
5.  NonTAL  N.A  0.4  NA.  149.4  N.A.  -14.0  NA.  -2.6  NA.  -0.6  N.A.  -11.8  N.A-  -6.1
6.  Other AL  -26.3  -35.1  -31.9  -59.3  2.6  2.3  -131  -0.3  -0.5  1.0  0.1  0.6  -0.2  0.0
7.  Non-SSA IAU  -9.4  -24.6  1336  -15.8  - .0  3.2  0.3  2.2  1.6  3.2  -0. I  1.0  0.3  0.9
9.  SSA  -11.9  -15.6  25.0  20.7  -3.1  -1.6  -0.2  0.5  -0.2  0.5  -04  -0.3  -02  0.1
9.  CFA  -10.0  -9.2  2.3  2.7  -5.4  -7.0  -3.0  -2.2  -1.5  0.9  -08  -06  -06  -0.5
10.  Non CFA  -13.0  -22.6  2.8  0.7  -0.6  45  0.1  3.1  -0.2  0.5  .01  07  01  136
11. IAL  -16.8  -21.7  -0.8  -0.4  1.7  -1.0  2.3  2.6  2.0  7.5  05  09  07  2.6
12. Non TAL  N.A,  -3.9  N.A.  4.3  N.A.  -6.8  N.A.  -2.0  N.A  -0S  N.A  -4.0  N.A  -1.3
13. OtherAL  -12.2  -19.6  2.2  2.5  -2.4  -0.6  -2.4  -2.2  07  04  -0S  -04  -04  -01
14. Non-SSA IAL  -33.6  -22.9  2.9  -2.6  -1.2  0.3  0.9  4.1  22  3  I  00  3.1  04  1.0
All ligures denote changc in th  Eil. cxcept RI-)ER  figurcs ,whic  percentage change. 'Aftcr  column figurcs show clngeinvariaile  for avrageof  years  the  first structural adjustmcnt or  tradecrelated  sectoral  adjustmcnt  loan from  the World  Bank or structural  adjustment  facility  from  the IMF.  compared to the average  of  the 3 years before the loan. 'Rcent'  column  figures  show change in variable  for  the most recent 3 years. compared to the 3 years before.  For  thc non TAL  countries,  the comparison is 3 mobt reccnt years versus  1980-82
REER  =  Real Effcctive  Exchange Rate  CM  =  Consumption  imports  Con=Total  consumption
(decrease indicates dcpreciation)  M  =  Total  imports  N.A-=  not applicable
BMP  =  Blaik  market  premium  NFCM  =  Non-food  consumption  imports
The classification  of countries  by  adjustmcnt status is as follows:
The  intensive  adjustmcnt lending  (IAL)  countries arc:  Cote d'lvoirm  Ghana, Guioira-lissats, Kenya. Madagascar.  Malawi,  Mauritania. Mauritius,  Nigeria. Scnegal. Tanzania,  Togo. Zambia. The non-trade adjustment lending (NTAL)  countries are: Botswana. Burkina Faso, Ethiopia. Lcsotho, Liberia,  Rwanda, Seychelks. Sudan,  Swaziland. Thc others (OAL)  are: Angola. Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic Chad, Congo, Gabon, Gambis Guinea  Mali,  Mozanibique, Niger. Sierra Leone. Somali,  Uganda, Zaire. Zimbabwc The non-SSA intensiVe  adjustment lending countrics (non-SSA [AL)  are: Bolivia,  Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Coas  Rica, Jaumica, Korea. Mcxico, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand,  Turkey,  and Uruguay. This classification foilows  the schemfe  in the third  report on adjustment lending (World  Bank, 1992). except that Burkina Faso  and Sudan were classificd as 'Other  AL'  in  tbe report on adjuitment  lending, but 'Non- TAL'  in the classification above  The adjustment loans to both these countrics in the early to mid-1980s wer  fertilizer  or agriculture loans, with  few or  no accompanying trade policy reforms.  (Burkina Fasc received  a SAL in 1991,  but our  data  serics  cnds  in 1990  or 1991.)
Sources:  BESD, IMF,  and World  Dcvelopment Report. 1990 data.
- 33 -The next 5 variables are different measures  of import penetration in the domestic market.  In
general, it would be expected  that as trade barriers are reduced, imports would increase as a fraction
of (iDP.2  Column  (3), the import-GDP  ratio, is a commonly  used measure of openness  based on
this idea.  This measure  has one serious flaw, particularly in the African context.  The problem is that
the first -- and sometimes only -- step in liberalization  is relaxing  restraints on imported capital goods,
inputs, and selected  consumer  goods that do not compete  with domestic production. Since production
of import substitutes  tends to be intensive  in imported inputs, the step may increase imports while
increasing  protection. 22
One way to minimize  this problem is to look at the most heavily protected sub-sectors  of imports.
Because  of the typical escalated  structure of protection, these tend to be consumption  goods, and
especially  non-food  consumption  goods.  Columns  (4) through (7) are measures  of the relative
composition  of imports and consumption. Increasing  shares of consumer  imports (or non-food
consumer  imports)  in total imports (or total non-food  imports) or in consumption  (or non-food
consumption)  would indicate  reduced protection. This measure is not a perfect measure of protection:
some protected import substitutes  are not consumer  goods and some consumer  goods do not compete
with domestic production  and so are not protected. But in principle, this should be a better indicator
of protection  than are total imports.
The results for SSA as a whole are quite mixed, with some indicators  showing increased and some
decreased  openness. Within some groups, however, the results are more consistent. By almost all
these measures,  the CFA economies  and the non-trade-adjusting  economies  have become more
21. How much they  would  increase,  however,  would  be determined  by the  extent  and design  of the liberalization  and  by the  degree  (and
speed) by which domestic producers could increase efficiency to compete with the imports.
22. In the long run, meps  that increase protection will generally reduce the total value of imports, since  the value of the final consumer
goods imports  displaced by the increased domestic production  will exceed the value of the increased  imports  of inputs and capital gooda.
This need not hold  in the short run,  however, since  capital good imports are  'lumpy.'  Even in the long run, it may not be true of observed
imports, since the marginal impors  displaced may be those in the black market.  This is also not true of negative value  added production,
which is not a trivial  qualification in the African context. One study concluded that 70 percent of Madagascar's  industrial sector was
producing negative value added,  e.g.,  the value at border prices of inputs exceeded that of outputs.  (See Jacquemont and Ass;don  1988.)
- 34 -protectionist, and the intensive  adjustment  lending countries  have become less protectionist. And, to
put the numbers in the table in perspective, it should be borne in mind that the average size across all
SSA countries in the sample of the M/GDP rat1io  is around 40 percent; that of CM/M about 33
percent; that of CM/CON about 10 percent; and that of NFCM/CON  about 6 percent.  So, a I
percentage  point change in NFCM/CON is more significant  than a similar change in M/GDP.
Viewed in this light, the increases for the IAL countries in the indicators based on consumer imports
look substantial. And by most measures, the openness  in these countJies  has continued  to increase in
recent years.  For the "other adjustment  lending"  (OAL) countries, the indicators are again mixed
about whether  there has been a reduction or an increase in openness  since the pre-adjustment  period.
There is, however, fairly consistent  evidence  that openness  has increased  somcwhat in recent years
compared to the years immediately  after the beginning  of adjustment. That is, for eight of the ten
import-penetration mea5 1res, the "Recent" column is larger -- less negative or more positive -- than
the "After" column.
2.  Quantitative  measures  of movements  in protection  rates
It is in principle possible to derive a numerical  estimate  of changes  in the tariff equivalent  of all
restrictions  on imports. Tiiis can be done using the import  demand function  as follows:
Let the demand for imports  be  M = a + bY +  c[PME  (I  + t)];  where M is imports (in quantity,
not value, terms), Y is income, PM is import price in dollars, E is the real exchange rate, and (1 +  t)
is the "tariff equivalent"  of import restrictions, that is, a measure of the increase in domestic prices
that would be needed  to reduce import demand to the same degree as the import restrictions. 23 If
23. In principle P.  E (I +t) is the 'full'  domestic price of the imported good. If it is rationed by a non price mechanism,  (I +t)  includes the
marginal value of waiting time, bribery, or other costs  incurred  to purchase the good.
- 35 -all variables are in natural logaiithms, then the above equation can be differentiated  and re-arranged
to show  %A (1+t)=-{%AM-b%AY-c[%APM+  %AE]1/c, where  %A is the percentage change
in a variable, and b and c are the import elasticities  with respect  to income and price.  Data is
available for imports, income, import prices, and the exchange  rate; and the elasticities  can be
estimated  (or assumed  on the basis of previous estimates  for other developing  countries), 24 so the
change in (I  + t) can be estimated. Essentially,  it is the residual change in imports that cannot be
explained  by changes  in income  or the major variables  that affect domestic prices (international  price
and exchange  rate fluctuations).
The results of these calculations,  using three different definitions  of imports and two definitions  of
the exchange rate, are reported in Table 6 for the seven country groupings. As in Table 5, the
'after" column reports the change  for the three years after the initiation  of the structural adjustment
program, relative  to the three years before the program. (The year the program began is excluded.)
The "recent" column reports the change for the most recent years, relative to the three years before
the program. Since the focus here is on measuring  changes in protection,  the three measures of
imports  are those which exclude imports  that are not produced  locally, or at least are not heavily
protected in most countries--food,  fuel, and inputs used in domestic  production of final goods.
Ideally, the calculations  would  have been based only on imports  competing  (actually or potentially)
with domestic  production, but it was not possible to identify these. In interpreting  the results of Table
6, it should be kept in mind that a decrease indicates  a reduction in protection.
24. Coefficients  estimated  country by country were quite erratic, even in sign, probably because  of the short data  series available
Consequently,  I used coefricient.  of b =  1.25  and c =  -I,  which are consistent  with the range  of values  for these  parameters  that Pritchett
(1987) estimated  for a broad sample  of developing  countries.  The demand  elasticity is also consistent  with those  found in de Rosa's (1992)
survey  of other authors' estimates.
- 36 -Table 6:  Change  in tariff equivalent  of Import  restrictions:  mean (lines 1-7)  and median  (lines 8-14)
(percentage  change)
Non-Food  Non-Fuei
Cons.  M  Cons,  M  M
i______________________  A,lcr  Recent  After  Recent  After  Recent
1.  SSA  -15.45  -31.2  -24.7  49.7  -27.3  -40.4
2.  CFA  -9.1  -16.4  -8.6  -17.5  -26.0  -30.8
3.  Non-CFA  -18.9  -39.5  -33.2  -66.7  -28.1  -45.7
4.  IAL  -43.2  -56.1  -68.1  -94.5  -50.0  -65.6
5.  Non-TAL  N.A.  40.4  N.A.  35.3  N.A.  13.9
6.  Other AL  -11.5  -38.3  -12.5  47.5  -27.2  -44.0
7.  non-SSA  IAL  4.4  -26.6  -9.4  -23.3  11.0  -6.2
8.  SSA  -12.7  -31.7  -25.8  40.3  -30.5  -36.0
9.  CFA  -1.2  -9.1  -2.5  -2.5  -22.4  -22.6
10. non-CFA  -27.2  -37.2  -37.5  -74.3  -32.1  -37.8
11. LAL  -38.0  -37.3  -54.8  -104.4  -46.7  41.2
12.  non-TAL  N.A.  0.9  N.A.  -2.5  N.A.  -2.8
13.  other AL  I  -10.5  -37.4  -29.5  -43.3  -31.1  -36.8
14.  non-SSA IAL  5.4  -23.4  2.8  -39.1  15.9  -16.0
Source:  B£SD and IMF data.
The results here indicate  that in SSA as a whole, there was rather modest reduction in (1 +t) in the
years after beginning  adjustment,  and protection  continued to decline thereafter. The reductions were
more modest for the CFA countries  than the non-CFA. Protection fell the most in the intensive
adjustment  lending countries, while declining  less in other adjusting countries  and actually increasing
in the non-trade-adjustment  lending (non-TAI  ) countries.
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a  4  IL 
adding the percentage  changes in the real exchange  rate and that of the estimated (I +t).25 This, in
effect, measures  how much relative incentive  for production  of importable  production has changed,
factoring in exchange  rate and comnmercial  policy. Since (1  +t)  was itself estimated  as a residual, the
numbers in the table should not be considered  independent  of the numbers in the previous table, but
they do show something  different. What these numbers indicate  is how the incentive  to produce
import-substitutes  has changed, taking into account  the effects of both "protection"  and the real
exchange  rate on domestic prices.
Table 7 Change ir incentives'  for importable  production: Mean (lines 1-7) and  Median (lines 8-14)
Non-Food  Non-Fuel
Cons.  M  Cons.  M  M
l_____________________  ,After  Recent  After  Recent  After  Recent
SSA  13.1  5.4  4.0  -11.4  -0.1  -5.6
CFA  2.9  -4.3  3.8  -5.1  -13.6  -18.5
Non-CFA  18.7  10.8  4.1  -14.7  7.3  1.4
|AL  14.7  6.1  .6.6  -27.6  9.9  -2.8
Non-TAL  N.A.  28.1  N.A.  23.0  N.A.  5.1
Other  AL  5.3  -5.2  5.0  -12.2  -10.2  -12.4
non-SSA IAL  -7.5  -55.4  -21.3  -52.1  -0.9  -35.0
SSA  9.2  -0.7  10.4  -11.1  -8.6  -11.7
CFA  7.5  -0.7  11.9  3.3  -20.9  -15.8
non-C,-A  22.9  -0.7  9.4  -16.6  1.7  -6.5
IAL  10.7  1.5  5.7  -12.9  8.4  -11.7
non-TAL  N.A.  22.9  N.A.  19.4  N.A.  -4.8
other  AL  7.1  -4.9  11.9  -30.7  -14.9  -9.2
non-SSA  IAL  8.1  -34.8  -5.5  -56.1  10.8  -33.6
a. 5%ARlER+%A(1  +t)
Source:  BrSD and IMF data.
25. If PM  is  import  border price, ER  the  exchange  rate and PD  the domestic  price, then P 0 = (PM)  (ER)  (I +l) and the ratio of the  domestic
to border price is (ER) (I +t). Thus,  % A(PD/PM)  % A  (ER) +  A(I  +t)
- 38  -Together, the evidence in Tables 5-7 seems to point to the following  tentative conclusions:
Protection  of impott substitutes  by tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in Sub-Saharan  Africa asa
whole has declined. Relative  to what were apparently  very high levels of protection  before the
reforms began, the original reductions  were moderate, though they have become more significant  in
recent years. Both the initial and subsequent  reductions in the intensive adjusters were much greater
than in other countries. Concurrently  with the reduction  of tariffs and NTBs, however, most countries
were devaluing  currencies in real terms. This was even true of CFA countries, though the extent of
devaluation  was much less than in others. Consequently,  the total incentives  to produce import
substitutes  relative  to nontradables  did not decline nearly as much as the protection  rates would
indicate, and may have even increased in some groups. This may partially explain why the import
penetration-based  policy indicators (Table 5) do not show more improvement.
IV.  Conclusions and implications
Adjustment  programs in SSA have been somewhat  less intensive  in trade policy reforms than have
the programs in other countries. Implementation  of trade policy reforms overall has been better in
SSA than in other countries, though the opposite  is true of the most important  reforms. There was
also a higher frequency  of retrogression in SSA and slower continued  progress after adjustment  loans
were fully disbursed.
As noted at the outset, the experience  of different African countries in implementing  trade policy
reforms has been quite diverse. As a group, the intensive  adjustment  lending countries  made
significant  progress in the 1980s  and early 1990s  by almost any measure.  Even within this group,
however, there was significant  variation, with countries  like Mauritius  and Ghana making  much
greater strides than others, and some making  progress that was later reversed, either dramatically
(Madagascar,  Zambia)  or incrementally  (Kenya, Senegal, Nigeria).
- 39 -By virtually  every measure, the CFA countries as a group have not been as successful  as the non-
CFA ccuntries in implSi  ntinrtradepolicy  reforms. This was indicated  directly by their higher rates
of underimplementation  of policy actions (particularly "critical" actions) and indirectly by the lower
values of the measures  of increased  openness  for these countries.
For SSA as a whole, progress is more impressive  in recent times than in earlier years. In many
countries, adjustment  did not begin  until the mid-1980s  (as measured by the first IMF or World Bank
adjustment  operation)  and relatively few measures  were implemented  up front. Underimplementation
rates of policy actions are lower based on the most recent information  than on information  as of the
last tranche release of adjustment  loans. The measures of changes in openness  almost all show greater
improvement  (compared to pre-adjustment  values) in 1989-91  than in the years following  the
beginning  of the adjustment  period in each country. Anecdotal  evidence  supports this conclusion,  and
indicates  more progress ir  1991  and 1992 in some countries that would not be picked up in our data
(e.g., Zambia, Tanzania). For the CFA countries, however, the evidence  on this is mixed. Their
underimplimentation  rates are lower in the most recent data, and by some measures-but  not all-their
openness  has improved  more in recent years. But by virtually all measures,  the improvements  relative
to earlier periods have not been as great as for non-CFA countries.
Reduction  in trade regime-based  protection  was largely offset by real devaluation in most country
groups, and by most measures, incentives  to produce import substitutes  actually improved in the years
immediately  after the first adjustment  loan relative to the pre-adjustment  period. In more recent years,
the incentives  have fallen, relative to the post-loan period, though the fall has been modest. This has
some relevance to the debate on whether  trade policy reform has proceeded so quickly that some
countries are in danger of "de-industrialization"  from the rapid disprotection  of import substituting
industry. The evidence  here argues that in general this is not the case: total incentives  have fallen only
- 40 -modestly, if at all. As with all averages, of course, these may obscure somespecific cases (countries
or industries)  where the experience  differs.
Tne evidence  on changes in protection  and in overall incentives  may also illustrate  why the CFA
has a relatively poor record in implementing  reforms. In spite of the fact that the CFA countries
showed  poorer implementation  of reforms and smaller reduction than non-CFA countries in trade
regime-based  protection,  they showed  larger declines in overall incentives  for import-substitute
production.  This, of course, was due to the fact that their rate of real devaluation  was much lower.
There may be a direct connection  here: their ability  to reduce tariffs and non-tariff  barriers to imports
may have been impeded by their inability  to offset these reductions by devaluations,  as other countries
did. This general principle is well understood.  But the quantitative  difference between  the CFA and
non-CFA  countries is interesting.  Non-CFA  countries reduced tariff-equivalent  protection in "recent"
years by 15-49  percentage  points (depending  on the measure used) more than CFA countries, while
incentives  declined  by 15-20  percentage  points more in the CFA countries.
An important  issue, distinct from the question  of how much progress has been made, is how open
the trade regimes are at this point in the adjustment  process. Put another way, the question is how
much more remains to be done. All of the quantitative  indicators in this paper are measures  of
changes, so by themselves  they are not capable  of answering this question. To draw any inferences  on
this, we have to rely on other information  as well. The indicators of change in tariff equivalent
protection  tell us that this fell between  30 and 50 percentage  points in SSA as a whole between the
beginning  of adjustment  in each country  and the period 1989-91. This is not a trivial decline.
However, given what we know about  the stringency  of import controls in the pre-adjustment
period-especially on the consumer  imports  upon which these estimates  of protection  reduction are
based-it  would not appear that this is sufficient  to reduce the protection  to moderate  levels, relative
to deep reformers in East Asia o. Latin America.
- 41  -This  conclusion  is reinforced by what we know about specific trade regimes.  Perh'ps the most
A  4'
important  problem is with foreign exchange allocation. Mauritius may be the only non-CFA country
in SSA where foreign exchange  allocation  has been market driven, (i.e., the currency is essentially
convertible  at a rate mimicing  a free-market  rate) for a substantial  period of time. In other countries,
this very basic reform has not begun, or has been only recently completed  (Ghana). Several countries,
most notably Ghana and Uganda, have reasonably  well-functioning  auctions. However, since they are
of the "Dutch" variety, they impose implicit  taxes on inframarginal  bidders; thus, different users of
foreign exchange  pay different prices, unlike a convertible  currency market, though the size of the tax
is limited  by other legal channels  for foreign exchange  purchase. In countries  undertaking  phased
currency  reforms, the first step (liberalizing  non-competitive  imported inputs and capital goods)
increased  effective  protection, though eventually  the liberalization  began to affect competing  imports.
Likewise, only a few countries are without import licensing requirements  for a substantial  portion of
competing  imports . CFA countries  have a (more or less) convertible currency, but have moved
slower than others in reducing other non-tariff  and tariff barriers.
On the export side, progress has been made in producer  pricing for traditional crops, but parastatal
marketing  enterprises  have generally  kept producer  prices de-linked from border prices and prevented
producers from realizing  the full benefits of exchange  rate adjustments. For non-traditional  exports,
retention  schemes  have been helpful, but licensing  requirements  connected  to foreign exchange
repatriation  regulations  remain a problem. And there has been little progress on establishing  efficient
systems  to give exporters access to inputs at internationally  competitive  prices, either through export
processing  zones, which are still in their infancy, or through duty drawback  or exemption  schemes,
which have long exisited, but remain plagued with disbursement  delays and consequent  low rates of
use.
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- 43  -b¶ox  1.  Reform Measurement: Caveat Lector
The trade policy reform indicators on which this paper relies are of three types, each with its own strengths
and shortcomings.  One indicator (section III  A) is anecdotal evidence of the experience of individual countries,
drawn  from various sources,  including the case studies carried out  in connection with this study  These
examples are illustrative and make certain  abstract points more concrete.  They cannot, of course,  prove or
disprove any general propositions.
The second, used  in Section III  B, is derived from data in the World Bank's Adjustment Lending
ConditionaLity  and Implementation Database (ALCID).  The ALCID contains information on most of the
adjustment lending operations of the World Bank since  1980. Each policy action associated with each loan is
classified as to the type of policy it involves,  its purpose,  its legal status with respect  to the loan,  its planned
timing relative to the loans disbursements,  its importance (whether it was "critical" to the success of the
adjustment effort), and (for a smaLler sample) its implementation status.  The main weakness of measures  based
on ALCID data is that summary statistics  - for example,  percentage of planned actions that were  actually
well-implemented - cannot control for the relative importance of some actions.  This problem is potentially
important, especially when restrictions are redundant;  it is in principle possible to remove 99% of all trade
restrictions but still have a very closed regimc if the remaining  S%  (e.g.,  exchange rationing) are the ones that
are the most "binding."  This problem is mitigated by the ALCID's  distinction of "critical"  versus  "non-
critical"  actions, but,  at the least,  some nuances are lost; some "non-critical"  actions are more important than
others, and this is not captured.  Other problems with the ALCID are the limited number of actions coded  for
implementation,  especialy  in recent years,  and the rather broad (and sometimes ambiguous) categories  used for
classifying different types of actions.  Its advantage,  however,  is its comprehensive coverage,  which enables
construction of a broader  picture of reforms all over SSA, as well as a comparison with other regions.
A third type of trade policy reformn  implementation indicator used in Section III  C is the openness of the
trade regime. This can be measured using several types of data. The ones that are available for a large sample
of countries relate to real exchange rates,  black market premia, and measures of import penetration.  These  are
to a large extent indirect measures of the openness of the trade regime,  since they reflect the results of trade
policy,  rather than the policy per se.  Black market premia,  for example,  are affected by poLitical and capital
market conditions as well as by exchange rationing for imports.  Likewise,  imports are affected by relative
prices and aggregate demand variables as well as by exchange controls and commercial  policy.  Import
measures are also sometimes criticized because changes in these may reflect exogenous changes in foreign
exchange availability,  rather than in underlying policy.  This has some validity,  but to the extent foreign
exchange is used to import goods competing with domestic products,  changes in its availability  do measure
changes in protection.  At P  rate,  in the absence of systematic time-series  data on the policy  instruments per
e, these are useful measures of the extent to which protection of import-substitutes has been reduced.  Thus,
they complemcnt the ALCID data, which can measure the extent  of reform,  but not (directly)  its effectiveness
in reducing the bias.  Furthermore,  some of the problems  mentioned above can be partially  resolved by the
techniques described in Section III  C. For  example,  the estimation of "tariff equivalent"  incorporates  a
correction-albeit  somewhat crude-for  the effects of import prices and aggregate demands on the demand  for
imports.
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